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Abstract 
Eyewitness identification is susceptible to error and, despite robust evidence 
that eyewitness confidence can provide an index of identification accuracy, there 
remains uncertainty as to how confidence should be collected and presented to 
jurors. Current guidelines recommend collecting confidence “in the witness’s own 
words”, but non-standardised expressions may be difficult for jurors to interpret. 
Two studies investigated the influence of verbal, numerical, and graphical 
expressions of eyewitness confidence on jury decision-making. Study One asked 44 
(male=18, female=26) jury eligible participants (i.e., 18 years of age or older) to 
convert 16 verbal expressions of confidence to a percentage score, in terms of 
estimated eyewitness accuracy. There was substantial variability in participants’ 
responses, suggesting that verbal expressions of confidence may have limited 
diagnostic value. In Study Two, 163 jury eligible participants read a mock police 
report and court transcript including testimony from an eyewitness, who identified 
the suspect and provided a numerical confidence estimate. Study two tested whether 
numerical confidence estimates facilitated framing effects that might make 
uncertainty salient and reduce jurors’ perceptions of identification reliability. We 
found little evidence of framing effects for numerical expressions of confidence. 
However, we also found that participant did not discriminate between moderate and 
high confidence estimates.  
Keywords: jury decision-making, eyewitness confidence, salience, verbal, 
numerical   
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 Eyewitness identification describes the process where an individual who has 
witnessed a crime is presented with a line-up (live or photo array; containing a 
suspect who may or may not be guilty, and other people who are known to be 
innocent) and attempts to identify which line-up member (if any) they believe to be 
the perpetrator (Wells, 1993). Eyewitness testimony is used within criminal and civil 
trials, and is often regarded as a chief form of evidence within a court of law (Powell, 
Garry, & Brewer, 2013). Despite the weight placed on eyewitness testimony by jury 
members, eyewitness identification can be prone to error and systematic distortion 
(e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Bradfield, Wells & Olson, 2002; Wixted & Wells, 
2017). Two types of errors an eyewitness can make when selecting from a line-up 
include identifying an innocent person or failing to identify a guilty person (Malpass 
& Devine, 1981). The first error is thought to be more detrimental, as it both 
incriminates an innocent suspect and increases the likelihood that the true perpetrator 
remains undetected (Malpass & Devine, 1981).  
 Despite the problems accompanying conventional eyewitness identification, 
there is now a compelling body of research demonstrating that eyewitness 
confidence can be informative in evaluating the reliability of identification evidence 
(Brewer & Wells, 2006; Palmer et al., 2013; Keast, Brewer, & Wells, 2007; Wixted 
& Wells, 2017). Specifically, there is robust evidence that initial estimates of 
eyewitness confidence hold diagnostic power (i.e., there exists a meaningful, positive 
confidence-accuracy relationship; e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Palmer et al., 2013). 
Whilst it is apparent that initial confidence estimates should be presented within a 
court of law, there are currently no systematic protocols in place for recording and 
presenting eyewitness confidence in a way that augments its informative value 
(Sauer & Brewer, 2015). This, in turn, may undermine the efficiency of confidence 
 	
3 
as an index of accuracy, within the applied setting of a court room (Sauer & Brewer, 
2015). 
 As noted by Sauer and Brewer (2015), a key issue to consider when 
collecting confidence estimates from an eyewitness is which scale would best 
capture its informative value. Where identification policy does mention confidence, 
it typically offers some variation of the suggestion that the witness’ confidence 
should be recorded “in their own words” (e.g., Technical Working Group for 
Eyewitness Evidence, 1999, p.38; Sauer & Brewer, 2015). However, variability in 
people’s interpretation of verbal expressions of probability has been demonstrated 
within a number of real-world settings (e.g., O’Brien, 1989; Handmer & Proudley, 
2007; Barclay et al., 1977). If this tendency were to extend to the courtroom, 
presenting jurors with verbal expressions of eyewitness confidence might lead to 
variability in interpretation across jury members. Although numerical methods of 
collecting and presenting eyewitness confidence might provide a viable alternative 
(Sauer & Brewer, 2015), there is some suggestion that numerical expressions of 
confidence may quantify eyewitness uncertainty to an objectionable extent. 
Specifically, prosecutors may worry that numerical confidence estimates will be 
“easily undermined” by the defence council (Sauer & Brewer, 2015, p. 201).  Given 
what we know about the effects of framing (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998), this 
concern may not be unfounded. Accordingly, there does exist some uncertainty as to 
whether eyewitness confidence should be collected and presented in verbal or 
numerical format. 
 The over-arching aim of the present research is to explore the most effective 
way in which to collect and present initial eyewitness confidence estimates to jury 
members within a court of law. To meet this goal, two studies are conducted 
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exploring juror perceptions of verbal, numerical, and graphical expressions of 
eyewitness confidence.  
The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship  
 Before exploring juror perceptions of eyewitness confidence, it is necessary 
to consider the confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship as it relates to eyewitness 
identification. 
  There is now a compelling body of research demonstrating that eyewitness 
confidence can be informative in evaluating the reliability of identification evidence, 
where a confidence estimate is taken from a chooser (i.e., an eyewitness who makes 
an identification) immediately after they select from a line-up (Brewer & Wells, 
2006; Palmer et al., 2013; Keast, Brewer, & Wells, 2007, Wixted & Wells, 2017). 
Brewer and Wells (2006), for example, conducted an experiment in which 1,200 
participants witnessed a simulated crime, and were asked to identify a waiter and a 
thief from two independent line-ups. Choosers (participants identifying someone) 
and non-choosers (participants rejecting the line-up) were asked to provide a 
confidence rating (reflecting the likely accuracy of the decision) immediately after 
having made a selection (or lack thereof), indicating their response on a 11-point 
scale from 0% to 100% confident. For choosers, there existed a positive CA 
relationship across all identification procedures (i.e., biased or un-biased ‘line-up 
instructions’, high or low ‘foil similarity’, and target-absent or target-present) for 
both suspect line-ups (Brewer & Wells, 2006). The calibration between confidence 
and accuracy was stronger in the upper half of the confidence scale, particularly for 
confidence estimates at 90% or higher (Brewer & Wells, 2006). This is consistent 
with research conducted Palmer et al. (2013), who also found that the CA calibration 
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becomes stronger with increased ratings of confidence. There was no evidence of a 
meaningful CA relationship for non-choosers (Palmer et al., 2013).  
 It is necessary to reiterate that the CA relationship holds true only for 
confidence ratings taken immediately after an identification (Sauer & Brewer, 2015). 
A number of biases can act to undermine the CA relationship after an identification 
has taken place (e.g., Luus & Wells, 1994; Shaw & McClure, 1996). Luus and Wells 
(1994), for example, examined the effect of co-witness feedback on 140 
eyewitnesses, who had already made a selection from a mock photo line-up. Amid 
other findings, informing participants that a co-witness had selected the same line-up 
member inflated their original estimates of confidence (while obviously not affecting 
accuracy). Similarly, Shaw and McClure (1996) investigated the effect of post-event 
questioning on college students who had witnessed a staged altercation. For elements 
of the event that had been the focus of repeated questioning, participants increased 
their ratings of confidence with no associated increase in accuracy (Shaw & 
McClure, 1996). 
 In light of the above evidence, researchers have recommended a simple 
solution: take a measure of eyewitness confidence immediately after a witness has 
selected from a line-up, and present this record of the witness’ confidence to jury 
members (Sauer & Brewer, 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). However, an important 
question remains unanswered; how should eyewitness confidence be measured and 
then presented to jury members within a court of law? Should it be presented in 
verbal, numerical, and/or graphical format? 
Measuring and Presenting Eyewitness Confidence: Verbal Expressions of 
Confidence 
 Where identification policies mention confidence, they typically offer some 
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variation of the suggestion that the witness’ confidence should be recorded in their 
“own words” (e.g., Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999, p.38;  
Police and Criminal Evidence Act Code D, 2017; Sauer & Brewer, 2015). This 
preference for verbal expressions of confidence is supported in part by research 
conducted by Windschitl and Wells (1996), who investigated the effect of measuring 
psychological uncertainty using verbal and numerical methods. This research 
demonstrated that verbal expressions of uncertainty, solicited through the 
presentation of multiple scenarios, were more sensitive “to various manipulations 
affecting psychological uncertainty” (e.g., framing and context), more predictive of 
participants “individual preferences”, and better reflected “behavioural intentions” 
(Windschitl & Wells, 1996, p. 343). Hence, verbal expressions of confidence may 
provide a more sensitive index of the eyewitness’s psychological uncertainty 
(Windschitl & Wells, 1996, p. 343).       
  Nonetheless, variability in people’s interpretation of verbal expressions of 
probability has been demonstrated within a number of real-world settings; this 
includes the areas of medicine (O’Brien, 1989), weather forecasting (Handmer & 
Proudley, 2007), and the military (Barclay et al., 1977). For example, O’Brien 
(1989, p. 98 - 99), conducted a study in which General Practioners (GPs) provided a 
‘percentage probability’ rating (0-100%) for 23 phrases or words (e.g., ‘likely’ or 
‘low risk’), that might be used to characterise uncertainty when describing to a 
patient the likelihood of experiencing a headache from a prescribed medication. 
Although more extreme verbal expressions of probability (e.g. ‘never’ and ‘certain’) 
were given more consistent probability ratings, other phrases, such as “significant 
chance”, yielded ratings that differed by as much as 47% (O’Brien, 1989, p. 98-99). 
Similarly, in a study conducted by NATO intelligence analysts, 23 officers were 
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asked to provide a numerical estimate of the probability of a certain military event 
taking place, based on various verbal expressions of uncertainty (Barclay et al., 1977, 
p. 79). The resulting data illustrated a large variation in the officers’ interpretation of 
each phrase (see Appendix A, Figure 5).       
 Applying these findings to the current context, it is apparent that verbal 
expressions of Eyewitness confidence might lead to inconsistent interpretations 
across jury members. Moreover, jurors’ interpretation of the degree of (un)certainty 
associated with the identification might vary significantly from the witness’ intended 
level of (un)certainty. If so, this would undermine the informational value of verbal 
expressions of confidence. Study One directly testes this idea, investigating whether 
the previously demonstrated variability in interpreting verbal expressions of 
confidence would translate to the eyewitness identification context. 
Measuring and Presenting Eyewitness Confidence: Numerical Expressions of 
Confidence 
 Although the above findings may point to the use of numerical expressions of 
eyewitness confidence, there does exist some suggestion that numerical expressions 
of confidence might emphasise eyewitness uncertainty to an objectionable extent 
(see Sauer & Brewer, 2015, for a review). As noted by Sauer and Brewer (2015, p. 
201), prosecutors may worry that numerical confidence estimates will be “easily 
undermined” by the defence council where eyewitness confidence is reframed in 
terms of uncertainty. Based on a review of the ‘framing effect’ within psychological 
literature (e.g., Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998), this concern may not be entirely 
unfounded. 
Framing Effects and Numerical Estimates of Confidence    
 Before considering how framing effects might affect jurors’ perceptions of 
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eyewitness identification evidence, it is first necessary to provide some general 
information about framing effects.        
 ‘Valence framing’ describes a phenomenon where objectively equivalent 
information is evaluated differently, as a function of whether it is presented in a 
“positive or negative light” (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, pg.150). Levin and 
Gaeth (1988), for example, found that participants rated beef labelled as ‘75% lean’ 
more positively than beef labelled as ‘25% fat’, despite these pieces of information 
being objectively equivalent. According to Levin & Gaeth (1988), attribute framing 
(a form of valence framing) may occur as people encode information in terms of its 
“descriptive valence” (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, p. 164). According to this 
theoretical account, the positive framing of an event or object may produce more 
positive associations within a person’s memory, thus facilitating more favourable 
judgements. If the same attribute is labelled as negative, however, an individual may 
encode this information in such a way that elicits negative associations (Levin & 
Gaeth, 1988; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998). This phenomenon is considered 
fairly robust and has been observed across a range on contexts (e.g. medicine, 
business, finance, and gambling; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998).    
 A closely related theoretical account is Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), which stipulates that information framed in a positive or negative 
light emphasises the “gains” and “losses” of a given situation, respectively (Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, p. 152). According to this theory of ‘risky choice 
framing’, positive frames are more likely to elicit risk aversion (i.e., where people try 
to reduce the uncertainty associated with a particular decision), whilst negative 
frames can encourage risk seeking in order to minimise or eliminate losses (Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979). A classic experiment exploring this phenomenon was undertaken by Tversky 
& Kahneman (1981, p. 453), where they asked participants to decide between two 
programs that were designed to combat a hypothetical “Asian Disease” which was 
“expected to kill 600 people”. There existed two equivalent versions of the medical-
decision-problem, where the problem was framed in a positive or negative light. In 
the positive frame, participants were asked to choose between Program A, where 
“200 people will be saved”, and Program B, where “there is 1/3 probability that 600 
people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved”. In the 
negative frame, participants were asked to choose between Program C, where “400 
people will die”, or Program D, where “there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will 
die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 
453). As per the theory of risky-choice framing, participants exposed to the positive 
frame were more likely to choose the sure option (Program A), whilst participants 
exposed to the negative frame were more likely choose the risky option (Program D; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998 ).    
 In light of the framing literature, it is important to consider how numerical 
quantifications of confidence will affect juror’s perceptions of eyewitness accuracy. 
Relative to the binary method of presenting eyewitness evidence (i.e., indicating that 
the eyewitness did or did not select the suspect-come-defendant from a line-up), 
numerical confidence estimates clearly outline the certainty of a witness (e.g., “I am 
90% certain”; Sauer & Brewer, 2015). However, this method also allows the defence 
council to clearly reframe the eyewitness’ expression of confidence in terms of 
uncertainty (e.g., 90% certain becomes 10% uncertain). Hence, as noted by Sauer 
and Brewer (2015), the prosecution may worry that this reframing of the 
identification evidence will make eyewitness uncertainty more salient to jury 
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members, thus undermining the perceived reliability of the identification evidence. 
Such effects would be particularly problematic at higher levels of confidence, where 
accuracy tends to be higher and jurors should put more stock in the identification 
evidence (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Palmer et al., 2013). Although framing effects 
are robust in the literature, it is necessary to note that a number of factors can 
mitigate the impact of framing (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Druckman, 2001).  
Mitigating the Effects of Framing 
 Although there is reason to believe that numerical quantifications of 
confidence might leave jurors susceptible to a framing effect, it is necessary to 
explore the conditions in which framing effects are more or less likely to occur. As 
noted by Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998), there are a number of factors that can 
reduce or eliminate the impact of framing, where the labelling of a given attribute as 
positive or negative (e.g., 90% confidence vs. 10% uncertainty) does not influence 
decision-making. Engaging in deeper elaboration is one such factor that has been 
shown to reduce the effects of framing (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; Druckman, 
2001; Takemura, 1994). For example, Takemura (1994) conducted a study using the 
same methodological approach and medical-decision-problem as Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1981), with one exception; participants were asked to either think 
about and write down a justification for their chosen option (i.e., high elaboration) or 
merely decide between the two available options (i.e., low elaboration). Where 
participants engaged in low elaboration, the findings were consistent with that of 
Tversky & Kahneman’s (1981), as participants demonstrated sensitivity to the risky-
choice frame. Where participants did engage in deeper elaboration, however, there 
was no framing effect (Takemura, 1994). This phenomenon may be explained with 
reference to literature on dual processing theories.     
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 Dual processing theories, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981, cited in Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), stipulate that people can engage 
in two “classes of cognitive operations” (Croskerry, 2009, p. 28; Evans, 2008; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). ‘System one’ (Stanovich & West, 2000; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981, cited in Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) relies on the use of heuristics 
(mental short cuts), requires minimal cognitive effort, and is vulnerable to error and 
cognitive bias (Stanovich & West, 2000; Croskerry, Abbass, & Wu, 2008). ‘System 
two’, on the other hand, is associated with slow and careful deliberation, greater 
cognitive investment, and is less automatic by nature (Stanovich & West, 2000; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1981, cited in Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Despite some debate within the 
literature, many authors agree that the framing effect arises from ‘system one’, or 
‘low-level’ processing (Cassotti et al., 2012; Donovan, & Jalleh, 2000; Guo, 
Trueblood, & Diederich, 2017; McElroy, & Seta, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002; 2007). Accordingly, if jurors do engage in ‘system two’ processing (e.g., 
deeper elaboration; Takemura, 1994) when considering evidence in court, reframing 
eyewitness confidence in terms of uncertainty may not undermine the perceived 
reliability of the identification evidence.  In order to explore this possibility, it is 
necessary to consider whether people do engage in deeper thought/deliberation when 
acting as juror, and whether this safeguards them against cognitive bias.  
 The main role of a jury within a court of law is to decide whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty of a given crime, based on the facts (i.e., evidence) 
of the case (White & Perrone, 2015). Given that the evaluation of evidence is central 
to their role as juror, one might expect jurors to engage in deep, critical thought when 
evaluating evidence. This is supported, in part, by research conducted by Gastil, 
Burkhalter & Black (2007), who gathered survey data from Seattle residents who had 
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served as jurors at the Seattle Municipal Courthouse. Survey responses indicated that 
from 55 juries (where at least two jury members responded to a second-wave 
survey), 89% had jury members who agreed or strongly agreed that the jury in which 
they sat “thoroughly discussed the relevant facts of the case” (Gastil, Burkhalter & 
Black, 2007, p. 350). However, self-report measures can be subject to social 
desirability bias, and need to be interpreted with care (e.g., van de Mortel, 2008). 
Moreover, there does exist some real-world examples which suggest that jurors do 
not always carefully evaluate evidence. For example, a three-month drug trial in 
Australia was terminated in 2008 when a number of the jury were found to be 
playing Sudoku and other word games during the trial (Davies, 2008). Similarly, in 
2017, a jury within the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court was dismissed when a jury 
member was found to be asleep, 15 minutes after the commencement of the trial 
(Hayes, 2017).         
 Although it is unwise to generalise from anecdotal evidence, it is clear that 
not all jurors are motivated to critically evaluate the facts of a given case. 
Furthermore, where a juror is motivated to engage in deeper elaboration, this may 
not safeguard them against cognitive biases such as the framing effect. This is 
because there a number of factors - such as fatigue (Croskerry, 2009), affect 
(Croskerry, Abbass, & Wu, 2008; Croskerry, 2005; Slovic et al., 2007), and 
distraction (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) - that can impede on the application of type two 
processing when reasoning about a particular stimulus. Given that jurors can be 
required to sit in a court room for hours at a time (e.g., O’Keeffe, 2018), listening to 
a multitude of evidence that may be emotionally taxing (Robertson, Davies & 
Nettleingham, 2009), it is not implausible that jurors resort to more automatised or 
heuristic based judgements. This argument is supported by literature on jury 
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decision-making which stipulates that there are a number of non-evidential factors 
that can influence a mock-juror’s perception of guilt, including race of the defendant 
(e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005), race and gender of the victim (e.g., Williams, Demuth, & 
Holcomb, 2007), and physical attractiveness of both the defendant and victim (e.g., 
Vrij & Firmin, 2001). Hence, where jurors are motivated to evaluate evidence 
conscientiously, they may still be susceptible to cognitive biases such as the framing 
effect.   
Graphical Expressions of Confidence 
 Another factor that reduces the effects of framing is the presentation of visual 
aids (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010). Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2010, p. 
1325), for example, conducted an experiment investigating the effect of visual aids 
when presented alongside medical risk information framed in a positive or negative 
light (e.g., “9 in 1,000 people die from this surgery” vs. “991 in 1,000 people survive 
this surgery”). The results indicated that participants with low numeracy were 
significantly more likely to fall prey to a valence framing effect than participants 
with high numeracy. This difference, however, was mitigated when participants with 
low numeracy were presented with some forms of visual aid (e.g., a bar graph) 
alongside the medical risk information (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010).  
 Although explanations as to why people low in numeracy may be more 
susceptible to the framing of numerical risk information vary, Reyna et al. (2009) 
suggested that, due to difficulty in deciphering the meaning of numerical material, 
people low in numeracy rely more-so on ‘affective interpretations’ of risk 
information. It therefore follows that people low in numeracy may be more sensitive 
to the way in which information is framed, rather than the numerical expression 
itself. This explanation is supported by a literature review conducted by Garcia-
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Retamero and Cokely (2017, p. 598), who concluded that transparent visual aids can 
improve people’s comprehension of risk information by increasing “the likelihood” 
that an individual will engage in deeper elaboration about the “relevant risks and 
trade-offs” of a given scenario. For example, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, Wicki, et al. 
(2016) demonstrated that presenting surgeons low in numeracy with a visual aid 
increased their comprehension of results from an experimental trial detailing post-
surgical side effects, by increasing the time taken to deliberate about the relevant 
risks. Deeper deliberation may also facilitate improved “cognitive self-evaluation”, 
thus enhancing cognitive monitoring (e.g., awareness of overconfidence; Garcia-
Retamero & Cokely, 2017, p. 582, 599). Hence, visual aids may encourage people to 
engage in deeper more-elaborative processing, thus reducing the influence of a 
framing effect (Takemura, 1994). It is therefore necessary to consider these findings 
within the context of jury decision-making.       
 According to a number of longitudinal studies, there still exists a sizable rate 
of low numeracy within developed countries (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017). 
Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010), for example, conducted a large representative 
study in both Germany and US, with findings that pointed to more than 25% of the 
adult population experiencing severe innumeracy. Given that jury members 
(traditionally) are selected at random from the electoral register (White & Perrone, 
2015), it is likely that some members of a jury will have low numeracy. Presenting 
jurors with a graphical representation of EW confidence may therefore be an 
effective means of reducing a framing effect, where eyewitness uncertainty is made 
salient (i.e. 10% uncertainty). It is important to note, however, that graph-literacy 
(i.e., the ability to interpret quantitative information presented in graphical form) can 
act as a moderating variable, in that people who experience difficulty in reading 
 	
15 
graphical information may not benefit from a visual aid (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 
2017). Moreover, research into visual aids and their effects on framed information 
has largely been conducted within a health-risk/medical domain (e.g. Garcia-
Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017), and associated 
findings may not necessarily generalise to a courtroom setting. Accordingly, further 
research should explore this phenomenon, specifically within the context of jury 
decision-making.  
The Present Studies 
 According to the Innocence Project (2017), eyewitness misidentification is a 
leading cause of wrongful conviction within the US. This, in part, is because 
eyewitness identification is susceptible to error and systematic distortion where care 
is not taken during the collection and presentation of EW evidence (Sauer & Brewer, 
2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). Despite robust evidence that initial estimates of 
eyewitness confidence have diagnostic power (i.e., a meaningful, positive CA 
relationship; e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Palmer et al., 2013), there remains 
uncertainty as to how this evidence should be collected and presented to jury 
members within a court of law (Sauer & Brewer, 2015). Although verbal expressions 
of probability may lead to variability in juror interpretations, prosecutors may be 
concerned that numerical quantifications of confidence will be easily undermined by 
the defence council (e.g., 90% certain becomes 10% uncertain), thus emphasising 
eyewitness uncertainty to an objectionable extent (Sauer & Brewer, 2015). Given 
what we know about the effects of framing (see Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, for 
a review), this concern may be warranted.       
 In light of the evidence presented above, the proposed research has two aims. 
First, to determine whether presenting confidence in verbal format leads to 
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variability in predictions of accuracy (measured in numeric terms) and, second, to 
assess whether presenting eyewitness uncertainty in numerical form may leave jurors 
susceptible to a framing effect (e.g., where attempts making an eyewitness’s 
uncertainty more salient may lead jurors to perceive identification evidence as 
unreliable), and whether graphical aids (presenting percentages in a graphical/visual 
form) might attenuate these framing effects. We expect that presenting confidence in 
word form will lead to variability in predictions of accuracy, and that presenting 
percentages in a graphical form will minimise valence framing effects that would 
otherwise be present in.  
Study One 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were 44 jury eligible adults (Male=18, 
Female=26), aged between 18 and 58 years (M=25.02, SD= 7.83).  
 There were no inclusion or exclusion criteria other than jury eligibility (i.e., 
18 years of age or older). Juries are traditionally composed of members of the 
general public randomly selected from the electoral register (White & Perrone, 
2015). Hence, juries should and can reflect diverse sectors of society and we wanted 
to let our sample reflect diversity. Survey responses were sourced from first-year 
psychology students and an international crowd-sourcing site called Prolific 
Academic. First-year psychology students were granted 30 minutes research 
participation credit, whilst participants from Prolific Academic were reimbursed 
£1.00 for adequate completion of the survey. 
 Design. Participants were surveyed, and asked to translate 16 verbal 
expressions of eyewitness confidence onto a 0 to 100% scale, in terms of estimated 
eyewitness accuracy. Hence, a within-subjects designed was utilised. The study was 
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conducted as an online questionnaire, with an estimated completion times of 10 
minutes.  
 Materials and Procedure. Participants were presented with a brief 
introduction explaining eyewitness identification, and asked to convert 16 verbal 
expressions of eyewitness confidence (e.g., “I am almost certain that my 
identification was accurate”) to a percentage score on scale from 0 to 100%, in terms 
of estimated eyewitness accuracy (where 0%= not at all likely to be accurate, 100%= 
certain to be accurate; see Appendix B for materials). This study was conducted as 
an online questionnaire, and the 16 verbal expressions were presented in a 
randomised order. The verbal expressions of probability were adapted from a similar 
study conducted by NATO intelligence analysists (Barclay et al., 1977, pg. 79), by 
re-contextualising each phrase to denote an eyewitness’ expression of confidence 
(see Appendix A, Figure 5, and Appendix B for a comparison.)  
Results and Discussion 
  Figure 1 depicts the variation in participant interpretations of verbal 
expressions of eyewitness confidence. This finding is consistent with the findings 
reported in Barclay (1977, pg. 79) which indicates large variability in people’s 
interpretation of verbal expressions of probability. Hence, the hypothesis that 
presenting eyewitness confidence in the format of words will lead to variability in 
mock-juror predictions of accuracy was supported (see Appendix C, Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics).  
 The results from Study One clearly illustrate discrepancy in participants’ 
interpretations of verbal expressions of eyewitness confidence.  This finding is 
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consistent with literature that demonstrates variability in people’s interpretation of 
verbal expressions of probability, within a number of real-world settings (e.g., 
weather forecasting, medicine, and the military; Handmer & Proudley, 2007; 
O’Brien, 1989; Barclay et al., 1977). Notably, the pattern of responses observed in 
Study One closely resembles that of CIA officers in a study by NATO intelligence 
analysts (Barclay et al., 1977), where the same verbal expressions of uncertainty 
were used to denote the likelihood of a particular military event taking place (e.g., “it 
is highly likely” or “it is almost certain”; Barclay et al., 1977, pg. 79). In both 
instances, numerical estimates attributed to the same 16 verbal expressions of 
uncertainty differed considerably between participants. Hence, variability in people’s 
interpretation of verbal expressions of probability may extend to a courtroom setting, 
Figure 1. Variability in Participant Interpretations of Verbal Expressions of 
Confidence 
 	
19 
as presenting eyewitness confidence in verbal format may elicit inconsistent 
interpretations across jury members. Likewise, a jurors’ interpretation of the degree 
of (un)certainty associated with the identification may vary significantly from the 
witness’ intended level of (un)certainty.       
 If there does exist such discrepancy between juror interpretation of verbal 
expressions of confidence, it does seem unlikely that collecting and presenting 
eyewitness confidence in verbal format will adequately relay the identification 
evidence in an informative manner. This is problematic given that confidence 
estimates taken immediately after an identification can provide an index of accuracy, 
especially where confidence estimates are higher (e.g., 90% confident; e.g., Brewer 
& Wells, 2006; Palmer et al., 2013; Sauer & Brewer, 2015). The results from Study 
One therefore question the validity of identification policy where line-up 
administrators are advised to collect confidence in the eyewitnesses “own words” 
(e.g., Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999, p.38; Sauer & 
Brewer, 2015).         
 Before discounting the use of verbal expressions of confidence within a court 
of law, it is necessary to consider the limitations of the present study. Firstly, 
participants performed this task independently. Within a real-world setting, it is 
possible that jurors would discuss with one-another the meaning of a verbal 
expression of confidence, possibly reducing inconsistency in their interpretations of 
the identification evidence. Although this is something to consider, the juries 
interpretation of the degree of (un)certainty might still vary significantly from the 
witness’ intended level of (un)certainty. Secondly, participants within this study 
interpreted verbal expressions of confidence through the presentation of a written 
statement (e.g., “I am almost certain that my identification was accurate.”). Given 
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that factors such as “tone of voice” and body language (e.g., hand gestures) can add 
meaning to spoken communication (Sauer & Brewer, 2015, p. 199; Kelly, et 
al.,1999), presenting jurors with a video-tape and/or audio-tape of the eyewitness’ 
verbal expression of confidence might better enhance the informative value of this 
identification evidence. This possibility should be explored through subsequent 
research where participants are presented with audio-visual recordings of verbal 
expressions of eyewitness confidence and asked to provide a corresponding 
numerical estimate of eyewitness accuracy (i.e., 0% to 100%). Finally, the sample 
size of this study was relatively small (n=44) which may compromise the 
generalisability of results. Accordingly, future research should seek to replicate this 
study using a larger sample of participants.       
 In sum, Study One provides preliminary evidence that collecting and 
presenting eyewitness confidence to jury members in verbal format will compromise 
the informative value of the identification evidence, due to variability in people’s 
interpretation of verbal expressions of confidence. Hence, Study Two attempted to 
identify whether collecting and expressing eyewitness confidence in numerical 
and/or graphical format may better serve the purpose of conveying initial confidence 
estimates to jury members within a court of law. 
Study Two 
Method 
 Participants. To partake in this study, participants had to be jury eligible 
(i.e., 18 years of age or older).  Survey responses were sourced from; members of the 
general public via a personal social media account, first-year psychology students 
from the University of Tasmania (UTAS), an international crowd-sourcing site called 
Prolific Academic, and individuals who expressed interest in payed research.  
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Participants sourced from social media were entered into the draw to win a $50 
Coles/Myer voucher, whilst first-year psychology students were granted 30 minutes 
research participation-credit. Participants sourced from Prolific Academic were 
compensated £2.50 for adequate completion of the survey, whilst three participants 
(affiliated with UTAS) who expressed interest in payed research were remunerated 
with a $10 Coles/Myer voucher each.      
 Survey responses from 25 participants were omitted from data analysis, as 
these participants did not complete the survey. An additional 17 survey responses 
were omitted, as these participants completed the survey in under 9 minutes or over 
120 minutes; results from a pilot study indicated that survey responses completed 
outside of this time frame (9 minutes-90 minutes) were of highly questionable 
quality. Omitting these survey responses, the remaining participants were 163 (male: 
93, female:70) jury eligible adults aged between 18 and 81 years (M=30.61, 
SD=12.66; excluding 12 survey responses where participants did not enter their age)
 Design. Participants were randomly allocated to one of eight cells of a 2 
(salience/framing: uncertainty salient vs uncertainty not salient) × 2 (modes of 
communication: numerical vs numerical expression and graph) × 2 (eyewitness 
confidence: high confidence vs moderate confidence) between-subject experimental 
design (see Appendix D, Table 2 for allocation of participants across conditions). 
The three dependent variables (DVs) were participants’ ratings of likely eyewitness 
accuracy and suspect guilt, both measured on a 9-point scale (from ‘Certain to be 
inaccurate’ to ‘Certain to be accurate’, and ‘Certain to be innocent’ to ‘Certain to be 
guilty’, respectively), and a categorical verdict of ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’. The 
continuous DV’s of belief in eyewitness accuracy and suspect guilt were included in 
conjunction with the categorical measure of verdict, in order to provide a more 
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sensitive measure of participant judgements. This was particularly important in 
Study Two, as participants were asked to base their judgements on limited evidence 
(i.e., the eyewitness’ positive identification of the suspect). The 9-point scale 
included visual anchors denoting strength or weakness in participant belief (e.g., +++ 
or ++, see Appendix E), as measuring people’s perceptions of numerical information 
using a numerical scale is arguably counterintuitive. 
 Materials and Procedure. Jury-eligible participants viewed a mock police 
report (see Appendix F) detailing an armed robbery where an unknown criminal 
robbed a bank at gun-point, and a suspect, Mr. Green, was taken to the police station 
for further questioning. Participants then read a corresponding court transcript 
detailing exchanges between the prosecution, judge, eyewitness, and defence 
council.  The court transcript included testimony from an eyewitness, Mr. Smith, 
who had previously identified the suspect-come-defendant, Mr. Green, from a 7-man 
line-up at the police station (see Appendix G, for an example).    
 The eyewitness provided a statement indicating that their initial confidence at 
the time of the identification was either high or moderate, depending on the 
condition. High and moderate confidence was expressed in numerical form (i.e. 
“90% confident” or “70% confident”), or numerical and graphical form (e.g. “70% 
confident” plus the depiction of a corresponding bar graph). In the ‘uncertainty 
salient’ condition, the trial transcript included an explicit question from the defence 
council reframing the witness’s confidence to explicitly highlight the degree of 
uncertainty (e.g., “Mr. Smith, you said that at the time of your identification you 
were 90% confident. Do you therefore acknowledge that you were 10% uncertain as 
to whether you had correctly identified the true perpetrator from the line-up?”), 
which was confirmed by the eyewitness (“I do acknowledge this fact”). In the 
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‘uncertainty not salient’ manipulation, questions from the defence council were 
omitted so that EW uncertainty was not made salient. Participants then rated likely 
eyewitness accuracy and suspect guilt on 9-point scales from ‘certain to be 
inaccurate’ to ‘certain to be accurate’, and ‘certain to innocent’ to ‘certain to be 
guilty’, respectively. Participants also provided a categorical verdict of ‘guilty’ or 
‘not guilty’.          
 After providing judgements of eyewitness accuracy and suspect guilt, 
participants completed the Berlin Numeracy test (Cokely et al., 2012) and the 
Schwartz et al. (1997) numeracy to assess numeracy, and allows us to gauge whether 
numeracy acted as a moderating variable on the impact of visual aids. When 
combined, these two tests have been shown to yield a normal distribution of scores 
with good discriminability, and this method is thought to be suitable when assessing 
a broad-range of numerical ability (i.e., high and low numeracy) that is present 
within the general population (Cokely et al., 2012). Participants also completed the 
Objective Graph Literacy (OGL) scale (Galesic & Garcia-Retamero, 2011) and 
Subjective Graph Literacy (SGL) scale (Garcia-Retamero et al., 2016), to gauge 
their ability to interpret quantitative information presented in graphical form (e.g., a 
bar graph portraying eyewitness confidence). Both scales have been shown to 
reliably predict people’s understanding of graphical information (Galesic & Garcia-
Retamero, 2011; Garcia-Retamero et al., 2016). As in Study One, the entire study 
was conducted as an online questionnaire.      
 A court transcript was used within Study Two to manipulate the key 
variables, as this presentation method is more practical, affordable, and time-
effective when compared to its counterparts (e.g., a live re-enactment), and is 
commonly used within the jury decision-making literate (e.g., Sauer, Palmer, & 
 	
24 
Brewer, 2017; see Bornstein, 1999, for a review). In an effort to improve its 
ecological validity, it was developed in consultation with a practicing lawyer who 
wishes to remain unidentified. 
Results                      
 Data Screening. Before conducting a univariate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) separately for each continuous DV, with ‘salience’, ‘confidence’, and 
‘graph’ as the independent variables (IV’s), the relevant data assumptions were 
checked. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, as the Levene’s Test 
of Equality of Error Variances was not significant for participant ratings of belief in 
eyewitness accuracy (p= .285) or suspect guilt (p=.402). Inspection of the histograms 
for the continuous depended variables showed that participant ratings of belief in 
eyewitness accuracy (skewness=-.961, kurtosis=.408) and suspect guilt (skewness=-
.260, kurtosis=.061) were both negatively skewed. Inspection of the Q-Q plot for 
belief in eyewitness accuracy also demonstrated a distinct curvature. However, this 
was not considered to be a great problem as ANOVA is relatively robust to 
violations of normality (Blanca, 2017). Analysis of the box plot for participant 
ratings of belief in eyewitness accuracy and suspect guilt revealed one extreme 
outlier (i.e., more than three interquartile ranges from the end of the box) in 
participant rating of suspect guilt. When the data was analysed excluding this data 
point the relevant effects remained the same. Hence, all data points were included 
within the final analysis.        
 When conducting a hierarchical logistic regression, initial inspection of the 
Cell Counts and Residual Table revealed that all expected cell counts were greater 
than 1, and more than 80% of expected cell counts were greater than 5.                        
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Testing for Framing Effects 
  A  2 (Salience/framing: uncertainty salient vs uncertainty not salient) × 2 
(modes of communication: numerical vs numerical expression and graph) × 2 
(eyewitness confidence: high confidence vs moderate confidence) univariate 
ANOVA (conducted separately for each continuous DV) did not reveal a significant 
main effect of ‘salience’ on participant ratings of belief in eyewitness accuracy, F(1, 
155)=2.20, MSE=2.97, p=.140, 𝜂"# =.014, or suspect guilt, F(1, 155)=2.38, 
MSE=2.36, p=.125, 𝜂"# =.015, as participant ratings of eyewitness accuracy and 
suspect guilt did not differ significantly as a function of whether eyewitness 
uncertainty was explicitly highlighted by the defence council (M=6.30, 
95%CI[5.92,6.68] and M=5.66, 95%CI[5.32, 6.00], respectively) or not (M=5.90, 
95%CI[5.53, 6.27] and M=5.29, 95%CI[4.96, 5.63], respectively). A hierarchical log 
linear analysis also revealed that ‘salience’ had a non-significant effect on verdict, p 
>.05. Hence, we found no evidence to support the hypothesis that presenting 
eyewitness uncertainty in numerical form will leave jurors susceptible to a framing 
effect (e.g., where attempts at making an eyewitness’s uncertainty more salient will 
lead jurors to perceive identification evidence as unreliable). Numeracy acted a non-
significant covariate when exploring the effect of ‘salience’ on participant ratings of 
belief in eyewitness accuracy or suspect guilt, p>.05.     
 However, a univariate ANOVA did reveal a significant interaction between 
‘salience’ and ‘graph’ on participant ratings of belief in suspect guilt, F(1, 
155)=5.38, MSE=2.36. p=.022, 𝜂"# = .034 (see Figure 2 and Appendix H, Table 3). 
As indicated by Figure 2, presenting mock-jurors with a visual aid alongside a 
numerical confidence estimate appeared to increase their rating of suspect guilt 
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where eyewitness uncertainty was explicitly highlighted (e.g., 10% uncertain), and 
reduce their rating of suspect guilt where only eyewitness certainty was left salient.  
 When splitting the data using ‘graph’ (i.e., no graph or graph) to organise 
output by group, the results indicated a significant main effect of ‘salience’ on 
participant ratings of belief in suspect guilt where participants were presented with a 
visual aid, F(1, 78)=7.33, MSE=2.41, p=.008, 𝜂"#=.086, and a non-significant main 
effect where participants were not presented with a visual aid, F(1, 77)=.307, 
MSE=2.30, p=.581, 𝜂"#=.004. This was inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
presenting participants with visual aids alongside the numerical confidence estimates 
would reduce or mitigate any framing effect. Adding graph literacy and numeracy as 
a covariate did not remove this significant effect.   
  
Figure 2. Line graph depicting the salience × graph relationship on participate ratings of 
belief in suspect guilt. 
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There was not a significant interaction between ‘salience’ and ‘graph’ on participant 
ratings of belief in eyewitness accuracy, F(1, 155)=.734, MSE=2.97, p=.393, η"#= 
.005 (See Appendix H, Table 3). Nor was there a significant main effect of ‘graph’ 
on participant ratings of belief in eyewitness accuracy, F(1, 155)=.013, MSE= 2.97, 
p=.908, η"#=.000, or suspect guilt, F(1, 155)=.939, MSE=2.36, p=.334, η"#=.006 (see 
Appendix H, Table 4). According to the hierarchical log linear analysis, there was 
also no main effect of ‘graph’ on verdict, p> .05. 
Testing for the Influence of Moderate and High Confidence  
 Surprisingly, a univariate ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of 
‘confidence’ on participant’s rating of belief in eyewitness accuracy, F(1, 
155)=1.618, MSE=2.97, p=.205,  η"#=.010, or suspect guilt, F(1, 155)=.48, 
MSE=2.36, p=.489 (see Appendix H, Table 5), as participant ratings of eyewitness 
accuracy and suspect guilt did not differ significantly as a function of whether the 
eyewitness indicated that they were 70% or 90% certain of their identification (see 
Figure 3 and 4). According to the hierarchical log linear analysis, there was also no 
main effect of ‘confidence’ on verdict, p >.05 (see Appendix H, Table 6).  
Figure 3.  Mean ratings of belief in 
eyewitness accuracy and confidence 
(moderate and high) with 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Figure 4. Mean ratings of belief in 
suspect guilt and confidence 
(moderate and high) with 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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 A univariate ANOVA revealed no significant interaction between 
‘confidence’ and ‘salience’ on participant ratings of belief in eyewitness accuracy, 
F(1, 155)= .584, MSE=2.97, p=.446, η"#=.004, or suspect guilt, F(1, 155)=1.64, 
MSE=2.36, p=.202, η"#=.010 (see Appendix H, Table 7). Nor was there a significant 
interaction between ‘confidence’ and ‘graph’ on participant ratings of eyewitness 
accuracy, F(1, 155)=1.04, MSE=2.97, p=.309, η"#=.007, or suspect guilt, 
F(1,155)=1.05, MSE=2.36, p=.308, η"#  =.007 (see Appendix H, Table 8). The 
hierarchical log linear analysis also revealed no significant interaction between any 
two of the independent variables, p>.05.  
Testing for a Three-way Interaction 
 A univariate ANONVA revealed no significant three-way interaction 
between ‘salience’, ‘confidence’ and ‘graph’ on participants’ ratings on belief in 
eyewitness accuracy, F(1, 155)=.216, MSE=2.97, p=.643, η"#  = .001 (see Appendix 
H, Table 9), and suspect guilt, F(1,155)=.845, MSE=2.36, p=.359, η"#=.005 (see 
Appendix H, Table 10). The hierarchical log linear regression also revealed no 
significant three-way interaction between ‘salience’, ‘confidence’, and ‘graph’ on 
verdict, p >.05.         
Discussion 
Numerical Confidence Estimates and the Framing Effect 
 The initial hypothesis that presenting eyewitness confidence in numerical 
form would leave jurors susceptible to framing effect was not supported, as 
participant ratings of belief in eyewitness accuracy, suspect guilt, and verdict did not 
differ significantly as a function of whether eyewitness uncertainty was explicitly 
highlighted by the defence council or not (i.e., if the court transcript included a 
statement from the defence-council reframing the eyewitness’ confidence in terms of 
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uncertainty or whether this statement was omitted).     
 This finding was somewhat inconsistent with the literature on ‘attribute 
framing’, which stipulates that framing information in a positive and negative light 
can facilitate favourable and unfavourable judgements, respectively (Levin & Gaeth, 
1988; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998). If attribute framing had occurred within this 
study, we would have expected participant ratings of eyewitness accuracy and 
suspect guilt to have been lower where eyewitness uncertainty was explicitly 
highlighted by the defence council (e.g., Defence Counsel: “do you therefore 
acknowledge that you were 10% uncertain at the time of the identification?”), and 
higher where only eyewitness confidence was made salient (e.g., Eyewitness: “I 
indicated that I was 90% confident at the time of the identification”; see  Levin & 
Gaeth, 1988 for an example). It is necessary to note, however, that the ‘framing’ 
present in this study differed from traditional studies that investigate valence framing 
(e.g., where participants are asked to rate beef that is labelled as 75% lean or 25% 
fat; Levin & Gaeth, 1988), as participants allocated to the negative frame (i.e., where 
the prosecution reframed eyewitness confidence in terms of uncertainty) were also 
exposed to an explicit statement from the eyewitness highlighting their confidence 
(i.e., a positive frame). Accordingly, presenting jurors with eyewitness uncertainty 
where eyewitness confidence had already been specified may not have evoked a true 
negative frame, thus failing to elicit a framing effect.     
 The results of this study were also potentially inconsistent with literature on 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which stipulates that information 
framed in a positive or negative light emphasises the ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ of a given 
situation, respectively (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, p. 152). If ‘risky-choice 
framing’ had played out within this study, we might have expected discrepancy in 
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participant responses where eyewitness uncertainty had been explicitly highlighted 
by defence council (a negative frame) or whether this statement had been omitted (a 
positive frame; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, p. 152; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). This expectation, however, was built on the premise that people might 
perceive jury decision-making as a risky choice scenario, where eyewitness 
uncertainty conveys a risk that the suspect is innocent. Accordingly, a risky-choice 
frame may not have been evoked as participants did not associate eyewitness 
uncertainty with subsequent risk or loss (see Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998, for a 
review).         
 Additionally, there are a number of factors that can reduce or eliminate the 
impact of framing generally, where labelling a given attribute as positive or negative 
does not influence decision-making (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Druckman, 
2001; Takemura, 1994). In this study, it is possible that participants engaged in 
deeper elaboration (i.e., ‘system two’ processing) when interpreting the identification 
evidence, thus reducing their susceptibility to cognitive bias (e.g., the framing effect; 
Takemura, 1994; Stanovich & West, 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, cited in Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). It is important to consider, however, that the crime scenario and 
evidence presented within this study was an abridged version of what may be 
presented within a real trial. Accordingly, jurors faced with more complex evidence 
and time-consuming processes may be less inclined or able to engage in deep 
elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, cited in Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Croskerry, 
2009).          
 Importantly, numeracy did not appear to mediate the relationship between 
‘salience’ (i.e., if the court transcript included a statement from the defence-council 
reframing the eyewitness’ confidence in terms of uncertainty or whether this 
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statement was omitted) and participant ratings of eyewitness accuracy, suspect guilt, 
and verdict, as numeracy (high and low) acted a non-significant covariate. 
Accordingly, there was no main effect of ‘salience’ (i.e., a framing effect) 
irrespective of whether participants had a high or low level of numeracy. Although 
this is (arguably) inconsistent with literature that stipulates people low in numeracy 
rely more-so on ‘affective interpretations’ of risk information (Reyna et al., 2009) – 
and may subsequently be more susceptible to a framing effect (e.g., Garcia-Retamero 
& Galesic, 2010) – this result is what we would expect given no true framing effect.
 The results of this study may therefore reduce potential concern from 
prosecutors that numerical expressions of eyewitness accuracy will undermine the 
validity of the identification evidence (i.e., where the prosecution rephrases 
eyewitness confidence in terms of uncertainty; Sauer & Brewer, 2015), thus 
supporting the notion that numerical estimates of eyewitness confidence should be 
collected and presented to jury members within a court of law.   
Graphical Confidence Estimates and the Framing Effect    
 Although we originally hypothesised that presenting participants with a 
visual aid alongside the numerical confidence estimates would reduce or mitigate 
any framing effect (see Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010), the results of this study 
would suggest that the reverse might be true. Where participants were presented with 
a visual aid alongside the numerical expression of confidence, there was a significant 
effect of ‘salience’ on participant ratings of belief in suspect guilt. Analysis of the 
‘Salience’ × ‘Graph’ interaction indicated that presenting participants with a visual 
aid increased their rating of suspect guilt where eyewitness uncertainty was explicitly 
highlighted, and reduced their rating of suspect guilt where only eyewitness certainty 
was made salient. That is, we found no framing effect in the non-graph conditions, 
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but presenting a graph gave rise to a framing effect.    
 This finding is counter-intuitive and inconsistent with research conducted by 
Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2010, p. 1325), who found that presenting visual aids 
alongside medical risk information framed in a positive or negative light (e.g., “9 in 
1,000 people die from this surgery” vs. “991 in 1,000 people survive this surgery”) 
mitigated the effects of framing, where participants had poor numeracy. Our results 
are also discordant with a literature review by Garcia-Retamero and Cokely (2017, p. 
598), who concluded that clear visual aids can improve people’s comprehension of 
risk information generally, by increasing the likelihood that an individual will engage 
in deeper elaboration. Our results from Study Two appear to contradict previous 
research on visual aids and their effects on framed information, as presenting 
participants with a bar graph alongside numerical confidence estimates (i.e., 70% and 
90% certain) appeared to elicit a framing effect, as a function of whether eyewitness 
uncertainty was explicitly highlighted by a defence council or whether this statement 
was omitted.         
 Although the findings from Study Two contradict a large body of research 
(see Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010), the 
pattern/direction of the interaction was not entirely surprising. For example, it was 
originally hypothesised that highlighting eyewitness confidence (i.e., 90% certain) 
would lead to higher participant perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and suspect 
guilt, whilst re-framing to emphasise eyewitness uncertainty (i.e., 10% uncertain) 
would lead to lower participant perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and suspect 
guilty, despite these numerical confidence estimates being objectively equivalent 
(see Levin & Gaeth, 1988 for an example). Accordingly, if a visual aid had mitigated 
the effects of framing (as described above), we would have expected that participant 
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ratings of belief in suspect guilt, eyewitness accuracy, and verdict would have 
reduced in the certainty salient condition (i.e., where only confidence was left 
salient), and increased in the uncertainty salient condition (i.e., where confidence 
was reframed in terms of uncertainty), thus leading to more consistent ratings 
between conditions.            
 It is important to note that research into visual aids and their effects on 
framed information has largely been conducted within a health-risk/medical domain 
(e.g. Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017). 
Accordingly, results from this study may differ from existing literature, due to 
potential differences in the thought processes involved in jury decision-making. 
However, the sample size within this study was considerably smaller than that used 
by Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2010; n=987), potentially limiting the 
generalisability of results. Future research should therefore aim to replicate this 
finding using a larger sample of participants. If a replication attempt yielded similar 
results, additional research should be conducted exploring the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms that might explain this finding. As it currently stands, we are unable to 
provide a coherent explanation as to why the addition of a bar graph may have 
evoked a framing effect that was not already present.     
 In summary, the results from Study Two provide preliminary evidence that 
presenting visual aids alongside numerical confidence estimates may evoke a 
framing effect where eyewitness confidence is framed in terms of certainty or 
uncertainty. Given that numerical confidence estimates (presented without a 
corresponding visual aid) do not appear to undermine the identification evidence 
where eyewitness uncertainty is explicitly highlighted, depicting the same 
information in a visual aid does seem unwarranted.  
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Confidence Estimates (90% vs 70% Certainty)      
 Unexpectedly, there was a non-significant difference between juror ratings of 
eyewitness accuracy, suspect guilt, and verdict (i.e., guilty or not guilt), between 
participants who were in the moderate or high confidence condition (i.e., where an 
eyewitness indicated that they were 70% or 90% confident at the time of the initial 
identification). This apparent lack of discrimination between high and moderate 
confidence is concerning, as research studying the CA relationship of initial 
eyewitness identifications has routinely found that choosers (i.e., eyewitness’ who do 
select from a line-up) who provide a confidence estimate of 90% have a higher rate 
of accuracy than choosers who provide a confidence estimate of 70% (e.g., Brewer & 
Wells, 2006; Palmer et al., 2013; Keast, Brewer, & Wells, 2007). For example, when 
Brewer and Wells (2006) asked participants to identify a waiter and thief from two 
independent line-ups following a staged crime, results of a calibration curve 
indicated that choosers who provided a 90% confidence estimate were correct 
approximately 75% - 80% of the time, where non-bias line-up instructions were 
given. Conversely, where choosers gave a 70% confidence estimate, they were 
accurate approximately 55% of the time. If jurors do not discriminate between 
confidence ratings of 90% and 70%, it also begs the question as to whether they 
would discriminate between numerical confidence estimates of greater disparity 
(e.g., 60% and 90% certainty).      
 However, that there does exist evidence to suggest that jurors do discriminate 
between numerical confidence estimates (e.g., Sauer, Palmer, & Brewer, 2017). For 
example, Sauer, Palmer, and Brewer (2017) presented participants with a mock court 
transcript where an eyewitness expressed high (90% confident) or low (50% 
confident) confidence in their identification of a suspect. They found that guilty 
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verdicts were considerably higher in the high confidence condition, when compared 
to the low confidence condition (Sauer, Palmer, & Brewer, 2017). Given that Study 
Two did not replicate this effect of confidence on participant responses, we should 
interpret our results with caution. It is also possible that people categorise numerical 
confidence estimates in terms of high-confidence (e.g., 60%-100%) and low-
confidence category (10%-50%), and do not discriminate past this distinction. This 
might explain why people can discriminate between confidence estimates of 50% 
and 90% (Sauer, Palmer, & Brewer, 2017), but not 70% and 90%. Future research 
should seek to explore this possibility.     
Summary and Conclusions 
Eyewitness misidentification is a major contributing factor to wrongful 
conviction within the US (The Innocence Project, 2017). This, in part, is because 
eyewitness identification is susceptible to error and systematic distortion where care 
is not taken during the collection and presentation of EW evidence (Sauer & Brewer, 
2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). Although initial estimates of eyewitness confidence 
can hold diagnostic power (i.e. a CA relationship; e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; 
Palmer et al., 2013), there still remains uncertainty as to how (i.e., in what format) 
evidence should be collected and presented to jury members within a court of law 
(Sauer & Brewer, 2015). In order to investigate this question, two studies were 
conducted examining the impact of verbal, numerical, and graphical expressions of 
eyewitness confidence on people’s decision making and associated judgment. 
Study One investigated people’s interpretation of verbal expressions of 
eyewitness confidence. Forty-five participants were asked to convert 16 verbal 
expressions of eyewitness confidence (e.g., “I am almost certain that my 
identification was accurate”) to a percentage score (i.e., 0 to 100%) in terms of 
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estimated eyewitness accuracy. In accordance with literature that has demonstrated a 
large variability in people’s interpretation of numerical expressions of probability 
(e.g., O’Brien, 1989; Handmer & Proudley, 2007; Barclay et al., 1977) there was a 
sizable discrepancy in participant responses across verbal expressions of confidence. 
The findings from Study One therefore question the utility of identification policy 
where line-up administrators/police are advised to collect confidence in the 
eyewitnesses “own words” (e.g., Technical Working Group for Eyewitness 
Evidence, 1999, p.38; see Sauer & Brewer, 2015, for a review). The authors do 
suggest, however, that future research should be conducted where participants are 
presented with audio-visual recordings of verbal expressions of eyewitness 
confidence, as factors such as “tone of voice” and body language (e.g., hand 
gestures) may enhance the informative value of identification evidence presented in 
verbal format (Sauer & Brewer, 2015, p. 199; Kelly, et al.,1999).  
Study Two investigated whether collecting and presenting numerical 
confidence estimates to jurors within a court of law might provide a viable 
alternative to verbal expressions of confidence. Participants were presented with a 
mock police report detailing information about an armed robbery, where a suspect 
was taken to the police station for further questioning. Participants were than 
presented with a court transcript including testimony from an eyewitness who had 
previously identified the suspect-come-defendant from a 7-man line-up at the police 
station. This court transcript included three manipulations: ‘salience’ (i.e., if the 
defence counsel reframed the eyewitness’ confidence in terms of uncertainty or 
whether this statement was omitted), confidence (i.e., if the eyewitness indicated 
they were 70% of 90% confident), and presentation mode (i.e., if the numerical 
expression was accompanied by a bar graph or not).  
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Contrary to potential criticism from prosecutors that numerical expressions of 
confidence will be easily undermined by the defence council (i.e., by reframing 
eyewitness confidence in terms of uncertainty; Sauer & Brewer, 2015), results from 
Study Two did not find a significant main effect of ‘salience’ (unless participants 
were also presented with a visual aid). This finding arguably supports 
recommendations that initial estimates of eyewitness confidence should be collected 
and presented to jury members in numerical format (Sauer & Brewer, 2015). The 
significant main effect of ‘salience’ when numerical confidence estimates were 
accompanied by a visual aid was surprising. This finding contradicts literature which 
stipulates that visual aids act to improve people’s comprehension of risk information 
generally, and can mitigate a framing effect where medical risk information is 
framed in a positive or negative light (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Garcia-
Retamero & Cokely, 2017). Future research should attempt to replicate this finding, 
and explore any underlying cognitive mechanisms that might help explain this result. 
Perhaps most concerning, results from Study Two indicated that participant ratings 
of belief in eyewitness accuracy, suspect guilt, and verdict, did not differ as a 
function of whether an eyewitness indicated that they were 70% or 90% confident at 
the time of the initial identification. This result is concerning, because an 
appropriately-collected confidence rating should be informative (Brewer & Wells, 
2006; Palmer et al., 2013; Keast, Brewer, & Wells, 2007). Accordingly, we 
recommend that future research be conducted exploring the degree to which people 
can distinguish between numerical confidence estimates (e.g., 90% vs 60% or 20% 
vs 50%).  
A potential limitation, particularly in Study Two, is that participants were 
obviously not real jury members, and the relevant crime and identification scenarios 
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were fictitious and simplified simulations of the information jurors encounter in a 
real-world trial.  Given that jury decision-making within a real-world setting can 
evoke a number of psychological processes relating to the theoretical constructs of 
memory, persuasion, decision-making, stereotyping, and group behaviour, it is 
possible that some characteristics of participant decision-making in Study Two 
differed from a real-world setting (Bornstein & Greene, 2011). Although this may 
question the ecological validity of the present research, a literature review conducted 
by Bornstein (1999) demonstrated that the majority of research using mock-jurors 
has obtained consistent results across modes of presentation (e.g., court transcript, 
visual and audio recordings, and re-enactments), and mock-jury samples (e.g., 
community members and undergraduate students). Moreover, Kerr and Bray (2017, 
p. 350) stated that, based on the “current state of theory and research”, it does appear 
“unjustifiable to dismiss the utility of standard simulation”. Accordingly, the results 
from Study Two should not be dismissed on the basis that participant were not real 
jury members. 
In summary, the results from study one suggests that presenting eyewitness 
confidence in verbal format may undermine the informative value of the 
identification evidence, due to variation in people’s interpretation of verbal 
expressions of confidence. Although numerical estimates of confidence did not 
influence juror decision-making in our study, there does exist evidence showing that 
eyewitness confidence does influence juror decision-making (e.g., Sauer, Palmer, & 
Brewer, 2017). Thus, collecting and presenting eyewitness’ initial confidence 
estimates in numerical format does appear to be the better option. Further, our 
research showed no framing effects on numerical confidence ratings in the standard 
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(i.e., no visual aid) condition, potentially addressing concern raised by applied 
practioners about the utility of numerical estimates (Sauer & Brewer, 2015).  
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Results from study reported in Barclay et al. (1977, pg. 79). 
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Appendix B 
Study One: Materials   
 
Sometimes, after a crime has taken place, police will ask a witness or victim of the 
crime to view a line-up and attempt to identify the offender.  Below are statements 
made by people who have witnessed a crime, and have subsequently identified 
someone from a 6-person line-up (i.e. containing the police’s suspect and 5 people 
who were known to be innocent) at a local police station. Sometimes, after 
identifying someone from a line-up, witnesses will provide an expression of 
confidence in the accuracy of their identification. Please rate, on a scale from 0% 
(not at all likely to be accurate) to 100% (extremely likely to be accurate), how likely 
you think it is that the witness’s identification was accurate, based on their verbal 
expressions of confidence: 
 
After having selected from a line-up, the witness states:  
 
“I am almost certain that my identification was accurate.”  
 
"It is highly likely that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"There is a very good chance that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"It is probable that my identification was accurate." 
 
"It is likely that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"My identification was probably accurate.”  
 
 "I believe that my identification was accurate.” 
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"There is better than even chance that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"I doubt that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"It is improbable that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"It is unlikely that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"My identification was probably not accurate.” 
 
"There is little chance that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"There is almost no chance that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"It is highly unlikely that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"The chances are slight that my identification was accurate.” 
 
"There is little chance that my identification was accurate.” 
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Appendix C 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Verbal Expressions of Eyewitness Confidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expression M (SD) Range 
   
Almost Certain 76.80(19.29) 25-100 
Highly Likely  71.70(24.83) 5-100 
Very Good Chance 70.68(20.59) 10-100 
Probable 58.43(19.53) 10-95 
Likely 66.25(17.94) 15-100 
Probably 59.93(21.13) 10-95 
I believe 69.45(22.31) 1-100 
Better Than Even Chance 59.41(19.54) 1-100 
Doubt 22.39(26.02) 0-100 
Improbable 22.64(23.72) 0-95 
Unlikely 23.75(24.94) 0-100 
Probably Not 23.55(22.58) 0-95 
Little Chance 14.95(19.94) 0-100 
Almost No Chance 15.45(24.19) 0-100 
Highly Unlikely 18.68(26.32) 0-100 
Slight 24.01(23.12) 0-90 
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Appendix D 
Table 2  
Study Two: Table of Conditions and Number of 
Participants (n) 
Condition n 
Uncertainty – moderate – no graph 20 
Uncertainty – moderate – graph  20 
Uncertainty – high – no graph  20 
Uncertainty – high – graph  20 
Certainty – moderate – no graph  21 
Certainty – moderate - graph 20 
Certainty – high – no graph  20 
Total  163 
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Appendix E 
Study Two: Question and Response Format 
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Appendix F 
Study Two: Mock Police Report 
 
Case Facts: 
On 01/04/2017 at approximately 1520 hours, a panic 
alarm at Westwealth Bank was activated, alerting 
police to an attempted robbery. 
 
A team of police officers arrived at Westwealth Bank 
at 1530 hours, to find that the offender had already 
fled the crime scene. According to eyewitness 
reports, a man of average height and build, wearing a 
black face-mask, blue jeans, and a black jacket, had 
entered the premises at approximately 1510 hours, 
holding a small handgun. According to witness 
statements, the offender had approached a desk clerk 
working at the central counter, pointed a gun in her 
direction, and demanded that she open the bank safe 
and pass him its contents.  
 
At this time, another employee, Mr. Watts, had 
reportedly activated the panic alarm from underneath 
his desk, causing a siren to emit throughout the 
building. This alarm had allegedly startled the 
offender, causing him to flee from the premises 
having only taken a $100 cheque that had been sitting 
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on the counter. Immediately after exiting the 
building, the offender had reportedly removed his 
face mask to avoid suspicion from pedestrians walking 
along the side-walk. One witness, Mr. Smith, reports 
to have seen the offender take of his mask and walk 
into a large crowd of people. 
 
At approximately 1535 hours, a patrolling officer in 
a neighbouring area pulled over a driver who appeared 
to be driving erratically. The male driver, Mr. 
Green, was of average height and build, and wore blue 
jeans and a white t-shirt. Having been informed about 
the recent armed robbery by a colleague, constable 
Cullen suspected that Mr. Green, who matched the 
general description of the armed robber, might be the 
escaping criminal, and requested that he come to the 
police station for further questioning.  
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Appendix G 
 
Study Two: Court Transcript 
 
Instructions: You have been selected as a jury member for this criminal 
case within an Australian Court of Law. It is your job to determine whether 
the suspect, Mr. Green, is guilty or not guilty of aggravated armed robbery, 
which can carry a prison sentence of up to 25 years.  
 
A trial-transcript is provided below, which details exchanges between the 
prosecution, judge, eyewitness, and the defence council. Please read this 
carefully. 
 
Court transcript in the matter of State v Green: 
 
Prosecution: Your Honour, I now refer you to the affidavit of Mr. Smith 
affirmed on the 2nd of April 2017, who was standing in close proximity 
to the banks entrance when the attempted armed robbery occurred. 
Your Honour will note from paragraph 3 of Mr. Smith’s affidavit that 
he was visiting the bank at the time of the robbery. 
 
Judge: Counsel, was Mr. Smith an eyewitness?  
 
Prosecution: Yes, your Honour. 
 
Judge: Please continue. 
 
Prosecution: Your Honour, I would like to call upon this witness for the 
prosecution; Mr. Smith.  
 
Swearing in of witness  
 
Prosecution: Mr. Smith, I refer you to paragraph 17 to 21 of your affidavit. 
Please tell the court what happened when you were called to the police 
station on the 2nd of April 2017. 
 
Eyewitness: When I was asked to present myself at the police station and 
identify who I saw leaving the bank after the robbery, I agreed to do so. At 
the police station, I was asked to stand in a room with an officer, whilst 7 
people were brought into an adjacent room with a large one-way window 
separating us. The officer asked me to identify, if possible, the man who had 
removed his face-mask once having exited the bank.  
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Prosecution: What happened next?  
 
Eyewitness: I selected the defendant, Mr. Green, from the line-up. The 
officer asked me to indicate from 0 to 100% how confident I was that I had 
correctly identified the criminal. I informed the officer that I was 90% 
confident (refer to graph). 
 
 
Prosecution:  Thank you Mr. Smith. Your Honour, I have no further 
questions for the witness.  
 
Judge: Do you have any questions, counsel [defence counsel]? 
 
Defence counsel: Yes your Honour, I have one question for Mr. Smith. 
 
Judge: Please proceed. 
 
Defence counsel: Mr. Smith, you said that at the time of your identification 
you were 90% confident. Do you therefore acknowledge that you were 10% 
uncertain as to whether you had correctly identified the true perpetrator 
from the line-up? 
 
Eyewitness: I do acknowledge this fact. 
 
Defence counsel: No further questions your Honour.  
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Appendix H 
Table 3 
Interaction Between Graph and Salience (Means and 95%CI intervals) 
 No Graph   Graph 
Belief in Suspect Guilt  M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Uncertainty Salient  5.50 [5.02, 5.98]  5.83 [5.35, 6.31] 
Certainty Salient   5.69 [5.21, 6.16]  4.90 [4.43, 5.36] 
Belief in Eyewitness 
Accuracy  
M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Uncertainty Salient  6.20 [5.66, 6.74]  6.40 [5.86, 6.94] 
Certainty Salient  6.03 [5.50, 6.56]  5.77 [5.24, 6.29] 
Note: CI = Confidence intervals  
 
Table 4  
Main Effect of Graph (Means and 95%CI intervals) 
 No Graph  Graph 
Continuous Measure M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Belief in Suspect Guilt 
Belief in Eyewitness Accuracy       
5.59 
6.12 
[5.26, 5.93] 
[5.74, 6.49] 
 5.36 
6.08 
[5.03, 5.70] 
[5.71, 6.46] 
Note: CI = Confidence intervals  
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Table 5  
Main Effect of Confidence (Means and 95%CI intervals) 
 Moderate Confidence   High Confidence  
Continuous Measure M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Belief in Suspect Guilt 
Belief in Eyewitness Accuracy         
5.39 
5.93               
[5.06, 5.73] 
[5.55, 6.31] 
 5.56 
6.27 
[5.23, 5.90] 
[5.90, 6.65] 
Note: CI = Confidence intervals  
 
Table 6 
Number of Guilty and Not Guilty Verdicts within the Moderate and High Confidence 
Condition (n) 
 Moderate Confidence   High Confidence  
Verdict   n  n 
Guilty  20 
61 
 22 
Not Guilty     60 
Note: n = Number of participants  
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Table 7 
Interaction Between Salience and Confidence (Means and 95%CI intervals) 
 Moderate 
Confidence (70%) 
 High Confidence (90%) 
Belief in Suspect Guilt  M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Uncertainty Salient  5.43 [4.95, 5.91]  5.90 [5.42, 6.38] 
Certainty Salient   5.36 [4.89, 5.84]  5.22 [4.75, 5.69] 
Belief in Eyewitness 
Accuracy  
M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Uncertainty Salient  6.03 [5.49, 6.56]  6.58 [6.04, 7.11] 
Certainty Salient   5.83 [5.30, 6.36]  5.97 [5.44, 6.49] 
Note: CI = Confidence intervals  
 
Table 8  
Interaction Between Graph and Confidence (Means and 95%CI intervals) 
 Moderate 
Confidence  
 High Confidence  
Belief in Suspect Guilt  M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
No Graph  5.39 [4.91, 5.86]  5.80 [5.32, 6.28] 
Graph   5.40 [4.92, 5.88]  5.32 [4.85, 5.79] 
Belief in Eyewitness 
Accuracy  
M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
No Graph  5.81 [5.27, 6.34]  6.43 [5.89, 6.97] 
Graph   6.05 [5.51, 6.59]  6.12 [5.59, 6.64] 
Note: CI = Confidence intervals  
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Table 9 
Participant Ratings of Belief in Eyewitness Identification: Three Way Interaction of 
Salience, Confidence, and Graph (Means and 95%CI intervals)  
 No Graph   Graph 
Uncertainty Salient  M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Moderate Confidence 5.85 [5.09, 6.61]   6.2 [5.44, 6.96] 
High Confidence    6.55 [5.79, 7.31]  6.60 [5.84, 7.36] 
Certainty Salient  M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Moderate Confidence  5.76 [5.02, 6.51]  5.90 [5.14, 6.66] 
High Confidence   6.30 [5.54, 7.06]  5.64 [4.91, 6.36] 
Note: CI = Confidence intervals  
 
Table 10  
Participant Ratings of Belief in Suspect Guilt: Three Way Interaction of Salience, 
Confidence, and Graph (Means and 95%CI intervals)  
 No Graph   Graph 
Uncertainty Salient  M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Moderate Confidence 5.25 [4.57, 5.93]  5.60 [4.92, 6.28] 
High Confidence    5.75 [5.07, 6.43]  6.05 [5.37, 6.73] 
Certainty Salient  M 95%CI  M 95%CI 
Moderate Confidence  5.52 [4.86, 6.19]  5.20 [4.52, 5.88] 
High Confidence   5.85 [5.17, 6.53]  4.59 [3.94, 5.24] 
Note: CI = Confidence intervals  
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Appendix I 
Participant information sheet: Study One 
A Study on Eyewitness Accuracy 
[Information sheet] 
 
1. Invitation  
You are invited to participate in a study that investigates jury decision-making within 
a court of law. This study will be conducted by Tatjana Peisker-Richings under the 
supervision of Dr. Jim Sauer, as part of their fourth-year Honours project at the 
University of Tasmania (Department of Psychology).  
2. What is the purpose of this study? 
This study aims to investigate how people differ in their perceptions of eyewitness 
accuracy when presented with various expressions of eyewitness confidence.  
3. Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participant in this study as you are 18 years of age or older. 
There will be no negative consequences if you choose not to participate in this study, 
as participation is entirely voluntary.  
4. What will I be asked to do? 
If you do decide to volunteer, you will be asked to rate various expressions of 
eyewitness confidence on a scale from 0% (not at all likely to be accurate) to 100% 
(extremely likely to be accurate). You will also be asked to provide some basic 
demographic information. 
This study will be conducted entirely online and take approximately 10 minutes to 
complete.  
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
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Participating in this study is not expected to result in any direct benefits. However, if 
you do decide to participate, you will be entered into the draw to win a $50 voucher, 
or receive 30 minutes research participation credit (if a first-year psychology 
student). 
6. Are there any possible risks from participating in this study? 
There are no foreseeable harms and/or risks that will result from participating in this 
study. 
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you do decide to participate, you may choose to withdraw from the study at any 
moment. As participation in this study is entirely voluntary, you will not be expected 
to give any explanation for your decision to do so. If you do decide to leave the study 
during its undertaking, information provided by you up until this point will not be 
recorded. However, it will not be possible to delete information after data-collection 
has taken place (i.e. you have submitted your questionnaire), as all information is 
given anonymously.  
8. What will happen to the information when the study is over? 
All data will be kept by the University of Tasmania, on a password-protected 
database. In accordance with best practice for open science, (anonymised) data will 
be retained so that it can be accessed by other researchers in the future. All data will 
be stored anonymously, in electronic format. 
9. How will the results of the study be published? 
Given that this research is being conducted as part of a fourth-year honours project, a 
summary of the results can be obtained by contacting the researcher after the date of 
thesis submission (18th October). 
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
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If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact the research team 
using the contact details provided. 
Tatjana Peisker-Richings: tpeisker@utas.edu.au 
Dr Jim Sauer: Jim.Sauer@utas.edu.au 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
+61 3 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote 
ethics reference number H0012660.  
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Appendix J 
Participant information sheet: Study Two  
A Study on Jury Decision-Making  
[participant information sheet] 
1. Invitation  
You are invited to participate in a study that investigates jury decision-making within 
a court of law. This study will be conducted by Tatjana Peisker-Richings under the 
supervision of Dr. Jim Sauer, as part of their fourth-year Honours project at the 
University of Tasmania (Department of Psychology).  
2. What is the purpose of this study? 
This study aims to investigate how people differ in their perceptions of eyewitness 
accuracy and suspect guilt when presented with evidence from a mock police report 
and criminal trial. 
3. Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study as you are 18 years of age or older. 
There will be no adverse consequences if you choose not to participate in this study, 
as participation is entirely voluntary.  
4. What will I be asked to do? 
If you do decide to volunteer, you will be asked to read a mock police report and 
court transcript that details information (and evidence) about an aggravated armed 
robbery. Based on these documents, you will be asked some questions relating to 
eyewitness accuracy and suspect guilt. Having answered these questions, you will be 
asked to provide some demographic information. Any information provided by you 
will remain anonymous.  
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This study will be conducted entirely online and take approximately 30 minutes to 
complete.  
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
Participating in this study is not expected to result in any direct benefits. However, if 
you do decide to participate, you will be entered into the draw to win a $50 voucher, 
or receive 30 minutes research participation credit (if a first-year psychology 
student). 
6. Are there any possible risks from participating in this study? 
There are no foreseeable harms and/or risks that will result from participating in this 
study, other than being exposed to a mock crime scenario in which an aggravated 
armed robbery has occurred. If there is a reason to believe that this will cause you 
distress, we advise that you do not participate.   
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you do decide to participate, you may choose to withdraw from the study at any 
moment. As participation in this study is entirely voluntary, you will not be expected 
to give any explanation for your decision to do so. If you do decide to leave the study 
during its undertaking, information provided by you up until this point will not be 
recorded. However, it will not be possible to delete information after data-collection 
has taken place (i.e. you have submitted your questionnaire), as all information is 
given anonymously.  
8. What will happen to the information when the study is over? 
All data will be kept by the University of Tasmania, on a password-protected 
database. In accordance with best practice for open science, (anonymised) data will 
be retained so that it can be accessed by other researchers in the future. All data will 
be stored anonymously, in electronic format. 
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9. How will the results of the study be published? 
Given that this research is being conducted as part of a fourth-year honours project, a 
summary of the results can be obtained by contacting the researcher after the date of 
thesis submission (18th October). 
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact the research team 
using the contact details provided. 
• Tatjana Peisker-Richings: tpeisker@utas.edu.au 
• Dr Jim Sauer: Jim.Sauer@utas.edu.au 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
+61 3  6226 6254  or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote 
ethics reference number H0012660.  
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Appendix K 
Copy of Email Showing Ethics Approval:  
Dear Dr Palmer	
 	
Ethics Ref: H0012660		
Title: Confidence in memory	
 	
This email is to confirm that the following amendment was approved by the Chair of the 
Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee on 26/7/2018:	
• Addition of student researchers Tatjana Peisker-Richings and Meriel Charles	
 	
All committees operating under the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network 
are registered and required to comply with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (NHMRC 2007, updated May 2015).	
 	
This email constitutes official approval. If your circumstances require a formal letter of 
amendment approval, please let us know.	
 	
Should you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me.	
 	
Kind regards	
Katherine	
 
 
 
 
 
 
